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Abstract: This research extends upon the previous work of pye and Warren (2005) and presents a refinement 
of the previously proposed critical infrastructure model to enhance further our understanding and appreciation 
of where the likely inter-play and existence of dependency relationships between infrastructures coexist. 
These associations are presented as a number of linkages that exist within each sector of Australia's critical 
infrastructure, which is then extended further to the modelling of dependency inter-relationships that exist 
between critical infrastructures utilising Petri Nets. The recognition and identification of such reliance 
relationships between critical infrastructures is necessary to allow both infrastructure owners and the 
government to identify and effectively manage and maintain the security, stability and availability of their 
particular critical infrastructure against potential scenario driven effects. These issues are reflected within a 
case study as modelled using the Petri Net approach to encapsulate the issues of reliance relationships by 
drawing upon an Australian commercial case study. 
Keywords: Critical infrastructure, dependency and relationship modelling. 
1. Introduction 
The challenge of secure management of nation's critical infrastructure remains an area of concern 
to both governments and the owners and operators of critical infrastructures, particularly within the 
current political climate. Although an island continent, Australia is not and cannot regard itself as 
being insulated from neither the current world perceptions and incidents nor those within the 
country itself. Therefore, the Australian federal government has led the way by establishing a 
conSUltative regime to manage the protection of Australia's critical infrastructure, since 2002, these 
initiatives have focused on developing robust protective and rapid recovery arrangements that 
involve (NCTC 2004): 
• Identifying and categorising infrastructure in each sector; 
• Determining general threats and risks; 
• Undertaking a program of vulnerability assessments for public and private sector owners and 
operators of infrastructure; 
• Analysing and modelling cross-sectoral interdependencies. 
In particular, it is the final point of this list relating to analysis and modelling of critical infrastructure 
and their dependencies that forms the primary focus of this research. 
This is because the diffusion of technologies, systems, their dependency inter-relationships and 
dispersion of ownership: presents specific management challenges for both the commercial owners 
and operators of critical infrastructure and the Australian federal government. To assist commercial 
enterprises and others with identifying and analysing their position, criticality and the associated 
security, ownership, operational and management responsibilities within the critical infrastructure 
network; the previous research of Pye and Warren (2005) has established a model representing a 
high-level overview of Australia's critical infrastructure. 
This research reflects and extends upon the previously proposed model and seeks to examine the 
model structure in further detail to reveal the issues and responsibilities that are incumbent upon 
the critical infrastructure owners and operators. This research further identifies the intricacies within 
the critical infrastructure system relating to position identification and develops the relational 
considerations that may have the potential to impact adversely upon the availability, security and 
expected normal function of the infrastructure as a whole or partially and the services they deliver. 
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Initially, a revision of the previous research is needed to establish the foundation of the critical 
infrastructure model and the infrastructure relational issues that were previously identified. Where 
upon this research will address the overlapping of critical infrastructures across levels, sectors and 
sub-sectors in detail, before progressing towards discussing and identifying the dependency types 
and the roles they play within the levels, sectors and sub-sectors of the Australian critical 
infrastructure model. Before finally modelling an infrastructure system case study to indicate how 
Petri Net modelling techniques can be applied to determine, identify and analyse critical 
infrastructure systems, their components and dependency relationships with other associated 
critical infrastructures. 
2. The Australian critical infrastructure model revisited 
As defined in the national strategy, 'critical infrastructure extends across many sectors of the 
economy including banking and finance, transport and distribution, energy, utilities, health, food 
supply and communications, as well as key government services and national icons' (TISN 2004a). 
Additionally the strategy indicates that some sectors, while not strictly regarded as infrastructure 
such as network systems or supply chains; by their implicit existence, do underpin the delivery of 
essential products and services and are consequently regarded as critical infrastructure. 
As established previously, the Pye and Warren (2005) model of Australia's critical infrastructure 
presents a high-level overall perspective and sectionalised view of the national infrastructure that is 
delineated into five clearly defined levels namely: Global; National; State; Corporate; and Personal. 
Within each of these levels, there exist sectors relating to such areas as: energy; utilities; transport; 
communications; health; food supply; finance; government services, national icons and essential 
manufacturing and then the sub-sectors represent the various individual critical infrastructures and 
their services (NCTC 2004). Therefore, the subsequent categorization of a critical infrastructure to 
a specific level relates to the extent to which their physical presence is apparent within a level, 
sector or sub-sector, with regard to the overall context of the model. Additionally, it was 
acknowledged that dependency and interdependency relationships can exist between 
infrastructures represented within the scope of the model, but these are not directly indicated or 
illustrated. 
2.1 Dependency and Interdependency between Infrastructures 
However, in some cases the continuity of supply of some critical infrastructure services is reliant to 
an extent upon the availability of other infrastructures and the provision of their services and 
furthermore, the national strategy notes that within some sectors a mutual dependence between 
infrastructures can exist. Additionally, the degree and complexity of such dependency relationships 
is growing as sectors become increasingly reliant on shared information systems and convergent 
communication technologies, including the Internet (TISN 2004a). 
Hence as defined by Pye and Warren (2005), a dependency relationship is based on the 
assumption that a reliance or influence exists from one infrastructure within a level, sector or sub-
sector to another, or multiple thereof, for the delivery of services. This dependency relationship 
would be regarded as heavily biased or a one-sided relationship, where if the supply infrastructure 
failed, then the reliant infrastructure would subsequently fail too, but if the reliant infrastructure were 
to fail initially, this would not negatively or perhaps only minimally impact upon the performance of 
the supply infrastructure and its availability would remain. 
If the dependency relationship was one of mutual reliance then Pye and Warren (2005) go on to 
assert that the reliance within the relationship is more equally distributed and should be regarded 
as a an interdependency relationship. Again, we recognise that within the interdependency 
relationship there exists a reliance or influence from one infrastructure within a level or sector to 
another, or multiple thereof, for the mutual exchange of services. Therefore, in this case both 
infrastructures are supplying essential services to the other infrastructure and if one or the other 
became unavailable or failed, then both infrastructures would consequently fail, hence they are 
interdependent upon one another for continued availability, viability, functionality and security of 
operation. 
178 
Graeme Pye and Matthew Warren 
Conclusively therefore, by being able to identify and model these dependency relationships this will 
allow the government and critical infrastructure owners and operators to reduce risk, work 
effectively together and apply considered strategies to maintain availability, viability, functionality, 
security and enhance rapid recovery of critical infrastructure performance. 
2.2 Critical infrastructure physical dependency types 
Initially, Pye and Warren (2005) identified a number of dependency types that can be used to 
describe physically, the dependency or interdependency relationships that may be identified as 
existing between infrastructures and these are represented as the following physical critical 
infrastructure types: 
• TCID (Total Critical Infrastructure Dependency) are those critical infrastructure dependencies 
that exist across all infrastructure levels modelled; 
• MCID (Multiple Critical Infrastructure Dependency) are those critical infrastructure 
dependencies that exist across three or more infrastructure levels, but not all; 
• BCID (Bridging Critical Infrastructure Dependency) are those critical infrastructure 
dependencies that exist between only two critical infrastructures levels. 
While these classifications exist in the original model shown in Figure 1, it is intended that they will 
become the focus of more in-depth analysis and explanation latter in this paper when discussing 
their actual physical characteristics and structure, which has remained as an aside to the critical 
infrastructure model in Figure 1. 
2.3 Current critical infrastructure model 
The model of Australia's critical infrastructure illustrated in Figure 1 represents the levels of 
infrastructure that exist within the Australian context and the sectors within each level, the sub-
sectors are where the critical infrastructures themselves are located within the defined structure. 
Therefore, public and private owners and operators of critical infrastructure can utilise this high-
level model to determine their positioning within the overall structure and begin to analyse, 
determine and appreciate their individual responsibilities and obligations to the national interest, 
other infrastructures and their likely dependence on other associated critical infrastructures and 
their services (Pye & Warren 2005). 
However, the specific boundaries illustrated between and within the infrastructure levels, sectors 
and sub-sectors are not definitive and critical infrastructures may physically overlap or impinge into 
other levels or sectors from their allocated sub-sectors and this requires further investigation to 
derive a common understanding and characterization of where and how within the infrastructure 
model, these situations occur. 
3. Characterizing overlapping critical infrastructures 
Typically, a critical infrastructure owner or operator could determine their particular infrastructure 
level based on the physical location of their particular critical infrastructure thereby resulting in the 
level classification of either: Global, National, State, Corporate or Personal, as proposed previously 
by Pye and Warren (2005). 
Although the Australian based model in Figure 1 represents each level of critical infrastructure as 
separate and distinct from each other, it is not necessarily the case that the critical infrastructures 
themselves are confined specifically to any particular level. In reality, critical infrastructures can 
overlap into other levels because of the services they deliver or through physical dependency 
relationships with other associated infrastructure that can be characterized as follows. 
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Communications 
Government SelVices 
Transport 
Communications 
Energy 
Federal Government 
SelVlces 
National Icons 
Transport 
Energy 
Transport 
Health 
State Government 
SelVices 
Essential Manufacturing 
Finance 
Food Supply 
Local Government 
SelVices 
Utilities 
Corporate Infrastructure 
Domestic Infrastructure 
MCID 
Nil (Telecommunications) 
Electricity 
Information Technology 
Global Level Infrastructure 
Telecommunications (Phone, Fax, Internet, Cables, Satellites), 
Electronic Mass Communication 
Postal SelVices 
Defence and Intelligence Facilities, Foreign Missions 
Air (inter-modal distribution centres), Sea (inter-modal distribution 
centres) 
Gas and Fuel Su plies oil and Gas Fields 
National Level Infrastructure 
Postal SelVices 
Interstate Transmission and Supply (Electricity, Gas, Petroleum Fuels) 
Key Residences, Nuclear Facilities, Essential Government Departments, 
Houses of Parliament 
Buildings, Cultural, Sport and Tourism 
State Level Infrastructure 
Generation, Processing and transmission (Electricity, Gas, Petroleum 
Fuels 
State Roads, Bridges, Tunnels, State Rail 
Hospitals, Public Health, research and Development Laboratories 
Emergency SelVices (Police, Fire, Ambulance), State Houses of 
Parliament 
Corporate Level Infrastructure 
Defence Industry, Heavy Industry and Chemicals, SCADA Systems 
Banking, Insurance and Trading Exchanges 
Bulk Production, Storage and Distribution, Processing, Cooperating 
Supply Chains 
Urban Councils and Shire Councils 
Water, Waste Water and Waste Management 
Electricit , Water, Gas; SME Networks; Cor orate Networks 
Personal Level Infrastructure 
Electricity, Water, Gas 
Home PC Networks 
SCID 
Defined as those dependencies that impinge across 
three or more critical infrastructures, but not all. 
Defined as those dependencies that impinge between 
only two critical infrastructures. 
Nil 
Electricity 
Information Technology 
Telecommunications 
Figure 1: Critical infrastructure model 
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3.1 Characterizing overlapping critical infrastructure 
What becomes apparent is that the critical infrastructure services may overlap across other levels, 
sectors and sub-sectors of infrastructure model because of the physical aspects that represent of 
the dependency relationships, which enables to infrastructure services to 'piggy-back' [sic] across 
levels and between associated critical infrastructures. Pye and Warren (2005) characterized this 
situation as being one of the three types of physical dependencies and physical associations 
embodied as TCID, MCID and BCID that characterise the conceptual existence of a dependent or 
an inter-dependent relationship between critical infrastructures. 
An example of this referred to in a report to the PMC (2004) noted that there is an increasing 
dependence on computer-based communications and technologies that are represented as the 
national information infrastructure (Nil). The report went on to acknowledge that because of this 
dependence there is potential that adverse incidents affecting the Nil could consequently cause 
significant harm to the community, damage property or disrupt essential services. 
The following examples illustrate how the Nil can be physically interconnected between 
infrastructures and across differing critical infrastructure levels and therefore illustrates the potential 
influence that the services delivered by the physical presence of the Nil may have on other related 
and interconnected infrastructures. 
3.1.1 aCID example 
Figure 2 represents a corporate organisation (Head office) that may have an established presence 
in one state that is categorized as State Level Infrastructure, while a separate Corporate Level 
Infrastructure (Sub-branch) is situated in a different state within the country. Therefore, without any 
physical communication infrastructure connection existing between the two offices that are 
independent or privately owned by the corporate organisation, any electronic communication 
requires the services of a BCID that is represented by the NIL This enables electronic 
communication between offices via a physical infrastructure bridge provided by the Nil, which 
consequently also creates a dependency relationship, where the corporate organisation is now 
reliant on the Nil services for electronic communication. 
['~-'-"--State Level InfultifructUlll H~ofTlCe 
_._----
BCID 
Nil InihlSlmclu.re 
"""",,,,,,,,,,,,,,.. 
Figure 2: Bridging critical infrastructure dependency (BCID) 
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Additionally, this simple example indicates how National Level Infrastructure represented by the 
Nil, overlaps both the State Level Infrastructure and Corporate Level Infrastructure of the corporate 
organisation, thus providing a bridging infrastructure that consequently adds further complexity 
considerations to critical infrastructure modelling and analysis. 
3.1.2 MCID example 
By extending the previous example, Figure 3 now illustrates how the Nil infrastructure can provide 
communication services across multiple infrastructure levels thereby delivering communication 
services that the corporate organisation can utilise without having to invest in providing their own 
communication infrastructure. Figure 3 depicts the Nil infrastructure as providing a physical MCID 
between three levels infrastructure, thus enabling electronic communication to be facilitated 
between and across differing infrastructure levels and environments. 
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Figure 3: Multiple critical infrastructure dependency (MelD) 
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Once again this is a simplified example, but Figure 3 is also illustrating how further complexity is 
added when dealing with delivering critical infrastructure services to and across multiple levels of 
infrastructure. 
3.1.3 TCID Example 
Furthermore, by extending the previous example again, Figure 4 depicts a physical representation 
of a TelD on the communication infrastructure; again, the Nil through its physical connections is 
providing electronic communication services to all levels of critical infrastructure. 
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Figure 4: Total critical infrastructure dependency (TeID) 
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These are simplistic examples of where physical infrastructure overlapping situations may exist and 
consideration has to be given when modelling the complex situations that involve MelD and TelD 
physical dependency associations between critical infrastructures. Therefore, thorough analysis is 
needed to recognise those physical associations that comprise a dependency relationship between 
critical infrastructures that do overlap levels, sectors and sub-sectors of the critical infrastructure 
model (Figure 1). 
Additionally, what becomes apparent in terms of potential critical infrastructure vulnerability, is that 
these physical dependency associations, BeID, MelD and TeID, that represent potential 'pinch-
points' [sic] or places of commonality that indicate a focal area of potential vulnerability within the 
interconnection structure exemplified. This is illustrates that with the common provision of services, 
as shown in Figures 2, 3 and 4, to multiple levels of critical infrastructure. The magnitude of any 
incident occurring and impairing the availability, functionality, security and viability of the 
dependency relationship between critical infrastructures, will be commensurate with the type of 
relationship and whether it is a biased dependency or mutual inter-dependency relationship. The 
degree of the impact with any incident scenario is difficult to quantify currently and is beyond the 
scope of this research, however this is significant consideration to measuring risk, survivability, 
recovery and resistance to adverse critical infrastructure incidents and to modelling potential 
outcomes. 
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However, while this establishes the types of physical dependency relationships and infrastructure 
associations between or across multiple critical infrastructure levels, this can be applied within 
sectors and sub-sectors of the Pye and Warren (2005) model. There is further need to determine 
the service dependencies that are common within the levels, sectors and sub-sectors of the critical 
infrastructure model and the part they play in the structure and functionality of Australia's critical 
infrastructure. 
4. Critical infrastructure service layers 
Not only can dependency relationships and associations exist between and across levels of 
Australia's critical infrastructure, there are also dependency and interdependency relationships that 
are prevalent within and across sectors and sub-sectors within the infrastructure levels as modelled 
by Pye and Warren (2005). This premise is also been identified by Australia's TISN (2004b) where 
sectors of infrastructure utilise other infrastructure services within the sector as they are essential 
to the continuity of supply of essential services to the community. Additionally, this is recognised as 
an area of potentially high vulnerability, particularly where a mutual inter-dependence between 
infrastructures and the service layers exist. 
As identified previously within the Pye and Warren (2005) critical infrastructure model the following 
infrastructure services form the layers that provide essential services to other infrastructures that 
they need to maintain functionality. Where this situation exists, the relationship will be either a 
dependency or ihter-dependency and therefore have a reliance on the continuity of services 
provided by the following infrastructure service layers: 
• Electricity; 
• Nil (Telecommunication); 
• Information Technologies (IT). 
This inter-dependency relationship between critical infrastructures indicates the prevalence of the 
infrastructure service layers required to support the very functionality of other critical infrastructure 
sectors, as illustrated by Figure 5. 
Banking and Fiunnce 
Government 
Figure 5: Critical infrastructure interdependencies simplified (PMSEIC 2002) 
Figure 5 illustrates the dependencies and inter-dependency relationships that exist between 
sectors and that as infrastructure service layers, electricity and communications have an 
interdependency relationship with all these sectors (PMSEIC 2002). Furthermore, based on the 
research of Marasea and Warren (2003) the communication relationship shown in Figure 5 is 
representative of the Australian Nil and by association the information technologies that support 
the operations and services of the Nil utilised by various infrastructures within their sectors. 
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4.1 Physical dependency relationships supporting infrastructure service layers 
Furthermore, the authors propose that the same physical associations will still exist between 
infrastructures within their sectors and across sub-sectors; as a result they can be represented 
physically as TCID, MCID and BCID dependency relationships. This now forms a significant part of 
the modelling analysis that organisations could undertake to establish their direct physical 
interconnection, positioning and subsequent dependency or inter-dependency relationships with 
other critical infrastructures. 
Therefore, based on the previous research of Pye and Warren (2005a) related to the modelling of 
simple critical infrastructure relationships utilising Petri Net modelling. This modelling research can 
be extended to represent the relationships between differing critical infrastructure systems and 
applied to a case study to illustrate how Petri Net modelling can enhance understanding, 
positioning and analysis of critical infrastructure systems and their dependency relationships and 
logical associations. 
5. Petri net modelling of critical infrastructure: A case study 
This case study is based on the coal fuelled power generation and electricity transmission and 
distribution systems that supply electrical energy throughout the Australian State of Victoria to 
domestic, corporate and industrial consumers. In particular, we are seeking to analyse and model 
the critical infrastructure systems at a number of differing levels of perspective to identify the 
underlaying dependency relationships, as they exist between the electrical power generation 
system and the electrical transmission and distribution system. 
The State of Victoria's power generation is predominately coal fuelled and is geographically located 
adjacent to these coal reserves in the Latrobe Valley region of country Victoria, additionally there is 
also a small coal fuelled power generation plant situated adjacent to another coal reserve at 
Anglesea. The main power generation centre for the whole of Victoria is based at Latrobe Valley 
and while the Anglesea power station does supply its excess power generation to the main 
electrical transmission and distribution delivery system, its predominate function is the provision of 
electrical power to the Point Henry Aluminium Smelter (VENCORP 2005). 
The diagram illustrated as Figure 6 depicts the physical layout and geographic locations of 
Victoria's coal fuelled power generation and the associated transmission and distribution system 
that is necessary for delivering electrical power to consumers throughout the state. Figure 6 is a 
high-level depiction of the critical infrastructure for the generation and distribution of electricity, 
while the enlarged diagram view specifically indicates the differing voltage distribution 
infrastructures and their layout around the central Victorian region, as well as the main points of 
distribution management within the electrical transmission and distribution system (VENCORP 
2005). 
Therefore, analysis and Petri Net modelling of this case study seeks to represent two separate 
critical infrastructures, namely the electrical generation system as the source of electricity, and the 
electrical distribution and transmission systems within the state of Victoria. However, although 
these infrastructures exist separately they are reliant on each others services for functionality and 
do co-operate together achieve their primary function, which is to deliver electricity supplies to 
state-wide customers and consumers and therefore this situational necessity illustrates the 
existence of a dependency relationship between these infrastructures. 
The following diagram Figure 6 is from the VENCORP (2005) report illustrates the main electrical 
generation and transmission and distribution infrastructure systems that the authors will model from 
initially the super-level model representation, to.a high-level model and down to a lower-level model 
aspect using Petri Nets to represent the integrated infrastructure systems. 
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Figure 6: Victorian electricity generation and transmission infrastructure (VENCORP 2005) 
It is proposed that by applying Petri Net modelling techniques that the two infrastructure systems 
can be modelled together as depicted in the case study and illustrated in Figure 6. Thus, by 
modelling the two independent infrastructure systems together at a number of differing levels of 
scale, this will deliver an enhanced means of analysis that can be applied to illustrate and identify 
how the systems function together, the complexity that exists, and the dependency relationship 
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between the electrical power generation infrastructure and the electrical distribution and 
transmission infrastructure. 
6. Modelling the case study infrastructure systems 
The modelling of the infrastructures presented in the case study will begin with a super-level 
interpretation that will be expanded to illustrate a high-level representation and finally a lower-level 
scale model pertaining to a selected part of the electricity transmission and distribution 
infrastructure. This will illustrate the scalability options that Petri Net modelling can deliver to the 
case study analysis to illustrate the underlaying infrastructure complexity that exists within the 
integration of electrical power generation infrastructure and the transmission and distribution 
infrastructure. 
Through further analysis it should become evident where potential 'pinch-points' [sic] are located 
within the critical infrastructure modelled and also the identification of key dependency relationships 
between infrastructures. This modelling technique should illustrate the scale of complexity that 
exists within the infrastructure systems, while still presenting the modelled systems with relative 
simplicity to aid in-depth analysis, understanding and system dynamics. 
6.1 Electricity generation and transmission infrastructure: Super-level perspective 
model 
Figure 7 illustrates a State Level Infrastructure (see Figure 1) represented as a super-level Petri 
Net model of the case study that indicating the source places and the sink places that represents 
where the electricity is generated and where the power is utilised. The super transition represents 
the entire infrastructure between the source and sinks that supports the overall system and enables 
full functionality from the generation of electricity through to transmission and delivery of electriCity 
to the consumer. 
Figure 7: Super-level model of electricity supply and distribution infrastructure 
The Figure 7 Petri Net model only represents an overview of the case study and therefore does not 
furnish any in-depth analysis or appreciation of how the two infrastructures are interconnected to 
deliver the electricity to the consumer. Therefore, further more detailed modelling at a high-level is 
required to illustrate the integration of the two infrastructure systems that are currently represented 
as the super transition in Figure 7. 
6.2 Electricity generation and transmission infrastructure: High-level perspective 
model 
The model shown in Figure 8 is a high-level overview representation of the integration and between 
power generation through to transmission and distribution to the consumers. This model represents 
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the generation of power utilising coal as the primary fuel source from two geographic locations, 
namely Anglesea that predominately generates power that is supplied to the Point Henry 
Aluminium Smelter and the other coal fuelled electricity generation source in the Latrobe Valley. As 
mentioned, the primary focus of the Anglesea power station is to generate electricity for the 
smelter, while the Latrobe Valley power stations generate electricity for the rest of state-based 
consumers that is delivered via the transmission and distribution infrastructure system. 
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Figure 8: High-level model of electricity supply and distribution infrastructure 
The Petri Net model depicted in Figure 8 depicts a high-level representation of the various 
infrastructures that are interconnected together to co-operatively deliver electricity from the fuel 
supply (source) to the consumer (sink). It now becomes apparent through analysis how these 
critical infrastructures are logically interconnected together and how they are dependent upon each 
other for the continued delivery of services, therefore exhibiting dependency relationships between 
the two critical infrastructures. 
Furthermore, Figure 8 enables the visualisation of critical 'pinch-points' [sic] within the infrastructure 
system, an example is if the 'Main Grid Transmission Infrastructure' place in the model (Figure 8) 
was to become non-functional, then no electricity would be supplied to the state-wide consumers 
until the situation was rectified. This indicates the presence of a physical dependency relationship 
between the Electricity Generation Infrastructure and the Electricity Distributors Infrastructure that 
is characteristic of a BCID (see 3.1.1) with the transmission infrastructure providing a bridging 
connection between the electrical generation infrastructure and the delivery infrastructure. 
This realisation should also indicate to corporate owners and operators of the transmission and 
distribution infrastructures represented within this place, the criticality of their responsibilities to 
maintaining infrastructure service availability to the other associated infrastructures and the 
overarching objective of continuing to deliver generated electricity to the consumer. 
Furthermore, it is possible to produce an additional Petri Net model of the 'Main Grid Transmission 
Infrastructure' place (Figure 8) to illustrate and represent in lower-level detail a model of the 
electricity transmission and distribution infrastructures specifically, thereby exhibiting the degree of 
complexity that exists at this particular level of the overall infrastructure system case study. 
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6.3 Main grid 220kV transmission infrastructure: Rowville perspective model 
Figure 9 is a Petri Net model illustrating a partial representation of the 220kV Transmission 
infrastructure only from the Rowville Power Distribution Centre perspective, as depicted in the 
enlarged section of Figure 6. This specific infrastructure is represented within the 'Main Grid 
Transmission Infrastructure' place in Figure 8 and logically represents the power transmission 
infrastructure currently in place, the complexity and critical infrastructure detail that can exist at this 
lower-level of the infrastructure system. 
Figure 9: Low-level of 220kV electricity distribution infrastructure (Rowville perspective) 
Once again, Figure 9 enables us to establish that the Rowville place, representing the Rowville 
Power Distribution Centre, is a 'pinch-point' [sic] within the system because its functional availability 
is crucial to the transmission and distribution of electricity throughout the rest of the infrastructure 
system. This is due to the Rowville place being the initial and primary connection point of 220kV-
generated electricity supplied from the Latrobe Valley power stations. 
This situation indicates that the continued functionality of the Rowville place infrastructure is crucial 
to the continued distribution of electricity to other associated distribution infrastructure. Therefore, 
the Rowville place is characteristic of the physical MCID (see 3.1.2) relationship because the 
Rowville place infrastructure is physically connected to other multiple transmission and delivery 
infrastructures that are dependent on its continued availability in order to deliver electricity to their 
consumers. 
Additionally, by analysing and modelling critical infrastructure to this extent, critical infrastructure 
owners and operators can develop an appreciation for their position within the overall infrastructure 
system and thereby work' toward risk reduction, develop co-operative working relationships and 
apply considered strategies to maintain availability, viability, functionality, security that enhances 
rapid recovery of critical infrastructure performance. 
7. Conclusion 
This research represents an advancement upon the previous research undertaken relating to 
developing a model that has categorized Australia's critical infrastructure according to levels of 
infrastructure, the sectors within each level and the sub-sectors of the critical infrastructures and 
their services (Pye & Warren 2005). 
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By establishing the existence of dependency relationships between and across level of critical 
infrastructures and how can be represented physically as TCID, MCID and BCID illustrates how 
they physically exist. Furthermore, it is possible for these same physical dependency relationships 
to exist between and across the critical infrastructure sectors and sub-sector of the overall 
structure. Additionally, it was identified that there are layers of infrastructure services, namely 
electricity, Nil and IT that are present across all sectors and that the sub-sector infrastructures are 
relationally dependent and reliant upon for continued normal functionality. 
Furthermore, this research also applies Petri Net modelling to a case study to illustrate the 
interconnection and physical dependency relationships that exists between associated 
infrastructures, in this case the electricity generation infrastructure and the transmission and 
distribution infrastructure. The modelling demonstrated the scalability advantages that this can 
deliver to analysis of two critical infrastructures, but further research is required to investigate the 
mapping of multiple relationships at a higher level to depict a national view. Additionally, further 
research is required to quantify the value of dependency relationships before progressing this 
modelling into software simulation and subsequently scenario-based testing. 
Finally, this research suggests that critical infrastructure owners and operators can utilise Petri Net 
modelling to identify their place in the overall structure and work toward risk reduction, work 
cooperatively with other associated infrastructures, develop and apply considered strategies to 
maintain availability, viability, functionality, security and enhance rapid recovery of critical 
infrastructure performance. 
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